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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
VIRGIL L. WOOD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
- vs -

Case No.
10471

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Defendant-Respondent.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE

The appellant, Virgil Wood, appeals from a
Judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah denying the appellant's petition for
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds: (1) appellant's
petition was res judicata, and (2) the appellant is
serving a concurrent sentence for robbery which
\1'Ta;.: unassailed by the present petition and the appellant's present complaint was improper.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appelant filed a petition for writ of habeas
,,.~,rµus

on various grounds on September 9, 1965.
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An answer and amended answer were filed, and
on October 5, 1965, Judge A. H. Ellett denied the
appellant's petition based upon previously filed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss this appeal which was
denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the decision of the trial
court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant filed a complaint for a writ of
habeas corpus seeking release from the Warden ol
the Utah State Prison (R. 1). He stated that he was illegally detained on conviction of the crimes of
grand larcency and robbery. The record shows his
conviction was to run concurrently with convictions
for crimes for which he was then serving in the
Utah State Prison (R. 2). An answer was filed by the
Warden, and then an amended answer denying
that appellant was entitled to consideration on
habeas corpus because he was concurrently serv·
ing a sentence for the same crimes (R. 23). The trial
court at the time of hearing denied the petition for
habeas corpus on the grounds that the appellant
was serving a concurrent sentence for the same
crime which he was not attacking, and his petitior. '
was barred because he hadn't raised the matter on
a previous petition for habeas corpus attacking hi:.
other sentence (R. 26).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT SINCE
APPELLANT WAS SERVING A CONCURRENT SENTENCE FOR THE SAME CRIME WHICH WAS UNASSAILED, NO BASIS EXISTED FOR HABEAS
CORPUS.

The issue contended for by the appellant is
that the trial court erred in not allowing appellant
to collaterally attack his robbery conviction because
he was serving a concurrent sentence for robbery.
Both sentences were from five years to life; U:ah
Cride Ann.§§ 71-51-1, -2 (1961).
It is submitted that the decision in Wilkinson v.

Harris, 109 Utah 76, 163 P.2d 1023 (1945) contrcls

this case. In that case the appellant was convicted of burglary and grand larcency and sentenced to indeterminate terms of imprisonment. Appellant challenged the sentence for both crimes.
The court ruled that appellant was validly held on
at least one charge and hence it need not consider
the validity of his contention. The court observed,
109 Utah at 77, 163 P.2d at 1023:
The court had jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the conviction for one of such offenses charged
was valid. Appellant has not yet served his sentence
on either conviction, and so we need not determine
here whether the court exceeded its jurisdiction in
sentencing him for two offenses. Until appellant has
served his sentence on one conviction he is not entitled to a discharge on a writ of habeas corpus.

serving a valid robbery conviction unassailed in the
In the instant case the appellant is concurrently
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present action. Therefore, under the rule in the
Wilkinson case habeas corpus will not lie to consider the other conviction. The appellant requests
the court to abandon the Wilkinson rule and adopt
a position allowing habeas corpus attacks on other
convictions even though the appellant is still serv
ing a valid sentence. Appellant contends Conners v.
Pratt, 38 Utah 258, 112 Pac. 399 (1910) so ruled and
should be reinstated as good precedent. It is submitted that that case does not support the appellan'.'s
position, and since Wilkinson was a later case de
cided under the "indeterminate sentence" law and
more in tune with the present day prolific use of th8
writ, the trial court's decision should be left undisturbed.
The Connors case presented a situation where
appellant was held on a first degree murder conviction and a subsequent burglary conviction. The
first degree murder conviction was concededly defective. The court agreed it could send the appellant
back to the Warden's custody. However, the cour'.
did not do so because the life sentence precluderl
consideration by the Board of Pardons of a reduceci
sentence which would have entitled the appel1~n1
to release. Thus, the court stated, 38 Utah at 261, 112
Pac. at 399:
In view of this anomalous situation, in so far 8'
plaintiff is concerned, and in view of the fact that.
although the life sentence may be void, the sta~e ma\
0
nevertheless prosecute the plaintiff for the cnme. ;
murder in case it be determined that h~ ~as. tne'.f
for that crime in a court having no junsd1ctJOn. '
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seems to us that justice requires that we at this time
pass upon the legality of the first commitment, so
that in the event that it should be declared void the
plaintiff may timely and in a proper manner present
the question of the reduction of the ten-year sentence
under which he is now held and which would b~
terminated if the board of pardons reduced that sentence for the maximum period of time fixed by the
statute ...

The situation was unusual and not the same
as the instant one, because even assuming the invalidity of the one sentence, appellant is still validly
held on the other. Also, there is no impediment to
his s'2eking timely release by the Board of Pardons
as was apparently the case in Connors. The Wilkinson rule should remain inviolate. The flood of
habeas corpus petitions requires some reasonabk?
limitation and the Wilkinson rule appears more in
harmony with the majority of jurisdictions including
the Federal Courts in the Tenth Circuit and the
United States Supreme Court.
In McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934), the United
States Supreme Court took a position comparable to
lhe Wilkinson case of this court. It ruled that habeas
corpus, as referred to in the Federal statute, meant
the common-law writ with its powers and limitation2.
The court ruled that the writ was available only to
test "the lawfulness of the detention" and would not
lie where the prisoner is "serving a part of his senlence not assailed as invalid." Thus, the appellant
herein, serving a valid sentence which runs concurrently with the sentence he challenges, is net
cmtitled to relief by habeas corpus.
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In Browning v. Crouse. 327 F.2d 529 OOth Cir1964), the court was faced with a case similar lo
the instant case. The appellant therein was convicted of several robbery counts and was sentenced
thereon. He was also convicted of being an habitual
offender and was sentenced thereon. The appellant
assailed the habitual criminal conviction on the
grounds that he did not have counsel, nor was he
advised of his rights to counsel at the time of his
previous convictions that constituted his habitual
criminal status. The court ruled it need not consider
the issue, since appellant was otherwise serving a
concurrent term for robbery. The court observed,
in affirming the trial court's denial of habeas cori)lli,
relief, 327 F.2d at 530:
The first point raised is that the liie sentence as
an habitual criminal is void because the two prior
felony convictions, on which the habitual criminal incarceration is based, were violative of appellant's
constitutional rights because he was not advised of
his right to, or permitted to have, the assistance of
counsel. The trial court found that in the first of
these, a 1943 Missouri conviction when appellant was
17 years of age, he was neither furnished counsel nor
advised of his constitutional rights. The court also
found that in the second, a 1950 Oklahoma convic·
tion, he was advised of his consitutional right to be
represented by counsel and did not request counsel.
We need not concern ourselves at this time with
the validity of either the Missouri or Oklahoma convictions. On three counts charging robbery, appcl~
lant was sentenced January 2, 1957, to concurren
15-year terms. The trial court found tha~ under thJ.
'Rules and Regulations of the Kansas Prison Boai
. se ntence
appellant could not be released from t his
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until he has served at least eight years and eleven
months. The finding is not contested.
McNally v. Hill, Warden, 293 U.S. 131, 135, 55
S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238, holds that when the detention
of a habeas petitioner is lawful under the sentence
on one count, there is no occasion for inquiry into the
validity of his conviction under another count. Although McNally concerned a federal prisoner, the
rule is applicable to federal habeas proceedings for
the release of a prisoner held under a state judgment
because the federal courts have no greater habeas
powers when considering the applications of state
prisoners. The present detention under the sentence
on the robbery counts is valid. The sentence as an
habitual criminal is separable. To review the habitual
criminal sentence at this time would depart from
the consistent federal practice of refusing to review
habeas corpus questions which do not concern the
lawfulness of the detention.

The above case is clear precedent for the trial
court's action in this case, and it is in accord with a
long line of unbroken decisions from the Tenth Circuit. McMahan v. Hunter, 150 F.2d 498 (10th Cir.
1945); Reger v. Hudspeth, 103 F.2d 825 (10th Cir.
1939); McGann v. Taylor, 289 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1961);
Crawford v. Taylor, 290 F.2d 197 (10th Cir. 1961); Holloway v. Looney, 207 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1953); Wood
v. Crouse, 327 F.2d 81 (10th Cir. 1964).
In Clark v. Turner, 350 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1965),
the court refused to inquire into appellant's detention at the Utah State Prison on a conviction where
he was otherwise validly held on another count, citing both Browning and McNally.
Numerous decisions from other federal courts
support the rule. Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (9th

8

Cir. 1965); Miller v. Gladden, 341 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.
1952); Oughton v. U.S., 215 F.2d 578 (9th Cir., 19541·
Sink v. Cox, 142 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1944); U.S. ex r~l'.
Rinaldi v. New Jersey. 321 F.2d 885 (3rd Cir. 1963);
It is submitted that this position is based on a realistic
appraisal of the purposes of habeas corpus. Further
various state courts, indeed the majority, also follo~
the same rule. Moore v. Hand. 187 Kan. 260, 356 P.2d
809 (1960); Application of Current, 76 Nev. 41, 348
P.2d 470 (1960); Burleaigh v. Raines, 359 P.2d 340
(Okla. Crim. App. 196]); Ex parte Mooney, 26 Wash.
2d 243, 173 P.2d 655 (1946); Petition of Wagner, 145
Mont. 101, 399 P.2d 761 (1965); Goodman v. State,
96 Ariz. 139, 393 P .2d 148 (1964).
It is, of course, recognized that some courts have
taken a contrary view. However, a reading of many
of these cases shows a local necessity or special
need. None is here present and the Wilkinson rule
should continue.
The trial court correctly denied the application
for habeas corpus.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE AP·
PLICATION FOR A WRIT OR HABEAS CORPUS BE·
CAUSE OF RES JUDICATA.

The trial court made a finding of fact

(R.

26):

1. That the petitioner, Virgil L. Wood, has
heretofore filed petitions for Writ of Habeas qorpus,
seeking review of his convictions and has fa~]ed te
raise in either of those petitions, the items raised m
the instant petition.
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The doctrine of res judicata has been recognized as applicable to habeas corpus matters in
Utah. Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118, 388 P.2d
412 (1964). It is the rule in Utah that where a party
brings a suit and fails to raise a basis for relief where
the opportunity presents itself a subsequent action
seeking to adjudicate such an issue will be deemed
barred. Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d
946 (1962); East Mill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake
City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863 (1945).
Since appellant could have raised the same issues in the previous actions the matter is now
barred.
- CONCLUSION -

The action of the trial court was based on sound
Utah precedent and policy. There is no reasoned
basis for abandoning the Wilkinson doctrine. It is
submitted that this court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General,
State of Utah
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

